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Colleen M. Flood* and Modernizing the Canada Health Act
Bryan Thomas**
The Canada Health Act (CHA) was adopted in 1984, to shore up a health-care
system conceptualized in the 1960s. Under the CHA, universal coverage is limited
to "medically necessary" hospital and physician services, to the exclusion of vital
goods and services such as outpatient pharmaceuticals, dental care, long-term
care, and many mental health services. Inequities resulting from these gaps in
public coverage are partly to blame for pushing Canada's health system to the
bottom of recent international rankings. But there is more to modernizing Canada s
health care system, we argue, than filling these gaps in universal coverage.
Every major health system review undertaken in Canada over the past decade
has ended with a call for greater accountability, and rightly so: accountability
is arguably the sine qua non of high-performing health systems. Whereas many
countries have established open and rigorous processes for evaluating health
goods and services, targeting public spending on those that deliver the biggest
bang for buck, Canada's governance mechanism for defining the medicare
basket is passive, opaque and only tenuously evidence-driven. A move to expand
medicare's scope of coverage must be accompanied by improvements in this
type of accountability.
La Loi canadienne sur la sant6 (LCS) a 6t6 adoptde en 1984 pour consolider un
systeme de soins de sant6 mis en place dans les anndes 1960. Sous le regime
de la LCS, la couverture universelle est limitde aux soins hospitaliers et mddicaux
<< mddicalement necessaires ,>> a Iexclusion des produits et des services tels
que les produits pharmaceutiques ambulatoires, les soins dentaires, les soins de
longue durde et de nombreux services en sant6 mentale. Les indgalitds resultant
de ces lacunes dans la couverture publique sont en partie a blimer pour le
classement en queue de peloton du systeme de sant6 canadien par rapport a
d'autres pays. Les auteurs soutiennent que la modernisation du systeme de soins
de sant6 du Canada exige beaucoup plus que de combler ces lacunes dans
la couverture universelle. C'est a juste titre que chaque examen approfondi du
systeme de sant6 entrepris au Canada au cours de la derniere ddcennie sest
conclu par un appel a une plus grande obligation de reddition de comptes :
cette obligation est sans doute I'6idment essentiel des systemes de sant6 les
plus efficaces. Alors que de nombreux pays ont mis en place un processus
ouvert et rigoureux pour 6valuer les produits et les services de sant6, ciblant les
ddpenses publiques sur les produits et les services les plus rentables pour les
sommes ddpensdes, le mdcanisme de gouvernance du Canada pour ddfinir le <
panier de soins >> est passif, opaque et n'a que des liens tdnus avec les preuves.
Une decision d'6largir la couverture de lassurance-maladie doit s'accompagner
d'ambliorations de ce type dobligation de reddition de comptes.
* Colleen M. Flood is a Professor in the University of Ottawa and a University Research Chair in
Health Law & Policy.
** Bryan Thomas is a Research Associate with the Ottawa Centre for Health Law, Policy & Ethics.
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Introduction
As we write about the future-in our case the future of the Canada Health
Act'-we have to reflect a little on the past. We have written extensively2
about constitutional challenges to Canadian medicare-particularly
Chaoulli v Quebec and its progeny.3 These challenges have drawn the
courts into a perennial debate in Canadian health policy concerning
whether patients have a "right" to purchase care privately, bypassing wait
times in the public system. But as we look to the future, we must look
up from immediate threats. While this rights-focused debate has taken
centre stage over the past decade, a more insidious threat to universality
has worked in the shadows: the steady erosion of medicare's promise, as
Canadians' actual health care needs migrate away from areas protected
under the CHA. In this article, we thus look forward-and do our best to
sketch a broad vision for modernizing the CHA to address this problem.
The CHA was adopted in 1984 to shore up a health care system
conceptualized in the 1960s. Under the CHA, universal coverage is limited
to "medically necessary" hospital and physician services, to the exclusion
of vital goods and services such as outpatient pharmaceuticals, dental
1. RSC 1985, c C-6 [CHA].
2. See e.g. Colleen M Flood, "Chaoulli: Political Undertows and Judicial Riptides" (2008) (Special
Edition) Health LJ 211; Colleen M Flood & Amanda Haugan, "Is Canada Odd? A Comparison of
European and Canadian Approaches to Choice and Regulation of the Public/Private Divide in Health
Care" (2010) 5:3 Health Economics, Policy & L 319; ColleenM Flood & Bryan Thomas, "Blurring of
the Public/Private Divide: The Canadian Chapter" (2010) 17:3 Eur J HealthL 257.
3. Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791 [Chaoulli]; Writ
of Summons filed by Dr. Brian Day and three other private surgical companies (2009), online:
<bchealthcoalition.ca/what-you-can-do/save-medicare/court-documents>.
Modernizing the Canada Health Act
care, long-term care, and many mental health services.' As Canada's
population ages and copes with growing levels of chronic disease, these
excluded categories of care represent a growing percentage of overall
health spending-a dynamic often termed "passive privatization." It is the
inequities resulting from these gaps in public coverage, in part, that push
Canada's health system to the bottom of recent international rankings, as
alarming numbers of low-income Canadians reply "yes" when asked, for
example, whether they "[d]id not get a recommended test, reatment, or
follow-up because of cost in the past year."' (The country's restrictions on
privately financed care-while the subject of endless hand-wringing by
courts and commentators here at home- are seldom even mentioned in
these international comparisons.)
There is more to modernizing the CHA than simply expanding the
scope of coverage. Every major health system review undertaken in
Canada over the past decade has ended with a clarion call for greater
accountability,6 and rightly so: accountability is arguably the sine qua non
of high performing health systems.' Health systems operate more fairly
and efficiently when rationing decisions are made through a transparent,
evidence-based process.
On the accountability score too, the CHA is decades behind the time.
In theory, provinces are held accountable to CHA's vision of universal
health care through financial incentives: the federal government is
authorized to withhold a portion of health transfers from provinces
that violate CHA principles by, for example, allowing extra-billing for
"medically necessary" services, or failing to provide comprehensive
coverage for same. Yet as health spending has grown as a percentage of
provincial spending over the years-driven in part by cuts to federal health
transfers in the 1990s-federal governments have persuaded themselves
that it is politically unfeasible to impose these financial penalties. Thus,
for example, when Quebec recently passed legislation that, among other
4. Colleen M Flood & Bryan Thomas, "Fragmented Law & Fragmented Lives: Canada's Mental
Health Care System" in Jennifer Chandler & Colleen M Flood, eds, Law and Mind: Mental Health
Law and Policy in Canada (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2016).
5. Karen Davis et al, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: How the Performance of the U.S. Health Care
System Compares Internationally (June 2014) at 24, online: The Commonwealth Fund <www.
commonwealthfund.org>.
6. Martha Jackman, "Charter Review as a Health Care Accountability Mechanism in Canada"
(2010) 18 Health LJ 1 at 29.
7. Colleen M Flood, "One Big Idea: Accountability" in Julio Fenk & Steven Hoffman, eds, "To
Save Humanity: " What Matters Most for a Healthy Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)
119; Colleen M Flood & Sujit Choudhry, "Strengthening the Foundations: Securing the Modernity of
the Canada Health Act" in Thomas A McIntosh, Pierre-Gerlier Forest & Gregory P Marchildon, eds,
The Governance ofHealth Care in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) 346.
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things, will normalize and regulate user fees-seemingly a clear-cut
violation of the CHA-the federal government was conspicuous in its
silence.' "The Canada Health Act is a dead letter," as leading columnist
Andrew Coyne put it back in 2010.9
More to the point, the CHA's framework of accountability, such as it is,
would be outdated and inadequate even if it were scrupulously enforced.
Whereas many countries have established open and rigorous processes
for evaluating health goods and services, targeting public spending on
those that deliver the biggest bang for the buck, Canada's governance
mechanism for defining the medicare basket is passive, opaque and only
tenuously evidence-driven.10 In our view, a move to expand medicare's
scope of coverage must be accompanied by improvements in this type of
accountability. Before delving into this more deeply, it is worth retracing
the historical developments that shaped the current CHA and created this
predicament.
I. History of the CHA and why it shows its age
As a legislative expression of the country's durable and defining values,
the CHA is perhaps second only to the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Calls to "modernize" the hallowed CHA therefore invite a
degree of cognitive dissonance: while it is appropriate to celebrate and
defend the CHA's core values of universality, accessibility and so on, one
must at the same time acknowledge that the CHA entrenches policy choices
that were compromises at the outset, and have impeded medicare's ability
to evolve alongside Canadians' changing health care needs ever since.
National medicare was established incrementally, following the
lead of Tommy Douglas's CCF government in Saskatchewan, whose
Saskatchewan Hospitalization Act, 1946 established that all hospital and
diagnostic services would be provided free of charge to residents of the
province." Inspired by the success of this program, the federal government
passed legislation in 1957-theHospitallnsurance andDiagnostic Services
Act-which offered 50/50 cost-sharing to all provincial governments that
8. Ryan Meili & Danielle Martin, "Federal politicians should be denouncing Quebec's new move
on health-care fees," Editorial, Montreal Gazette (13 October 2015), online: <www.montrealgazette.
com>.
9. Andrew Coyne, "It's Like Putting a Puzzle Together," Maclean s (9 April 2010), online: <www.
macleans.ca>.
10. Colleen M Flood, Carolyn Tuohy & Mark Stabile, "What Is In and Out of Medicare? Who
Decides?" in Colleen M Flood, ed, Just Medicare: Whath In, What's Out, How We Decide (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2006) 15.
11. SS 1946, c 82.
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followed Saskatchewan's model and provided hospital and diagnostic
services to all residents on "uniform terms and conditions."12
Its coffers flush with this new financial support from Ottawa,
Saskatchewan's CCF government next enacted legislation in 1961 that
would provide universal coverage for physician services outside ofhospital.
This met strong opposition from organized medicine, as physicians
feared losing professional autonomy and economic bargaining power as
medicine came under increased government control.13 A doctors' strike in
Saskatchewan was resolved only through assurances that doctors would
remain independent professionals, billing government on a fee-for-service
basis, while government's role would be limiting to paying the bills." This
design feature cast a long shadow over the future of medicare," and may
be partly to blame for the ongoing lack of systems-level accountability, as
described below. The federal government, again following Saskatchewan's
lead, rolled out the Medical Care Act 6 in 1966, requiring that provinces
receiving federal funding provide universal coverage for hospital and
physician services."
Problems of accessibility surfaced in the 1970s, as physicians engaged
in extra-billing (i.e., charging patients a discretionary sum on top of fees
paid by provincial plans)." The federal government responded in 1984 by
adopting the CHA. The latter specifically prohibits user charges and extra-
billing, and, in addition, requires that provincial insurance plans comply
with five broad principles: comprehensiveness, accessibility, universality,
public administration, and portability. As under the prior Medicare Act,
provincial compliance with the CHA is achieved using a carrot-and-
stick approach, with federal government offering the provinces vanous
financial supports for health care on the condition that they enact laws
and regulations prohibiting extra-billing and user charges, and comply
with the five principles. This approach has largely worked, as provinces
across the country have enacted a range of legislative measures to meet the
conditions imposed by the CHA.1 9
12. SC 1957, c 28.
13. Gregory P Marchildon, The Evolution ofMedicare in Canada (Report on Behalf of the Attorney
General of British Columbia, 2013) at 9-13.
14. Ibid at 9.
15. Carolyn Tuohy, Accidental Logics: The Dynamics of Change in the Health Care Arena in the
United States, Britain, and Canada (Oxford University Press, 1999) at chapter 7.
16. SC 1966-67, c 64.
17. Marchildon, supra note 13 at 25-27.
18. Ibid at 27-28.
19. Colleen M Flood & Tom Archibald, "The Illegality of Private Health Care in Canada" (2001)
164:6 CMAJ 825.
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From the writings of medicare's principal architects, it appears that
protections for medically necessary hospital and physician services were
meant only as the foundation of a more comprehensive public system. For
example, Justice Emmett Hall writes in the 1964 Royal Commission on
Health Services Report that, "prescribed drugs should be introduced as a
benefit," as "an early objective of the Canadian Parliament."2 0 In a sense,
then, deference to the CHA has contributed to calcifying the system at
a point where its incremental expansion stalled in the 1960s-reflecting
the state of medicine at the time, which centered around hospital and
physician services.
Likewise, the CHA's lax approach to systems-level accountability
is a vestige of the past, partly reflecting political compromises reached
early on. From medicare's embryonic stage in Saskatchewan, Canadian
physicians have used the threat of strikes to fiercely guard their professional
autonomy-securing a uniquely hands-off governance arrangement in
which they operate as self-regulated, independent contractors, billing
government on a fee-for-service basis, and are largely entrusted to define
the medicare basket through their individual and collective judgments
about the volume and mix of care provided (more on this below).2 1 This
can be contrasted, for example, with England's National Health Service
(NHS), where physicians work under contract, are paid by way of a
salary and are currently beholden to job plans in the public sector that
include quality standards, outcome and efficiency measures, and clinical
standards.22
II. How do we decide what services are publicly funded?
It is safe to say that no policymaker conceptualizing a health system in
2016 would settle upon the CHA's model. Canadians-particularly those
at the lower end of the income spectrum-are suffering major health
incidents, and in some cases losing their lives due to arbitrary gaps in
coverage. For example, a recent study found that roughly 5,000 deaths and
up to 2,700 heart attacks could have been prevented among younger and
middle-aged diabetes patients in Ontario, over the six-year period studied,
20. Emmett M Hall, Royal Commission on Health Services Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964)
at 39-40. For more discussion, see Steven G Morgan & Jamie R Daw, "CanadianPharmacare: Looking
Back, Looking Forward" (2012) 8:1 Healthcare Policy 14 at 16; Katherine Boothe, "How the Pace of
Change Affects the Scope of Reform: Pharmaceutical Insurance in Canada, Australia, and the United
Kingdom" (2012) 37:5 J Health Pol, Pol'y & L 779.
21. Tuohy, supra note 15 at chapter 7; Flood, Tuohy & Stabile, supra note 10.
22. English National Health Service, Terms and Conditions-Consultants (England) 2003 (London,
National Health Service, 2007).
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if the province had a universal drug plan.2 3 The lack of universal drug
coverage appears also to have a general effect on access to care, as lower
income Canadians avoid or delay seeking care for fear of incurring costly
prescriptions.24 Beyond these glaring concerns about equitable access,
the CHA's gaps in coverage result in overall higher costs. For example,
Canadian physicians are remunerated on a fee-for-service basis and
have no incentive to consider the financial implications of the drugs they
prescribe. Under a more comprehensive scheme, incentives could be put
in place to internalize these costs for physicians, for example, by requiring
physicians to operate within "prescribing budgets."2 5
When it is not issuing categorical exclusions, the CHA is surprisingly
open-ended in defining the medicare basket. Section 2 of the CHA
notionally limits medicare dollars to "medically necessary" hospital
services and "medically required" physician services. But there is
no rigour in the application of these limitations-as Nuala Kenny puts
it, "medical necessity is what doctors decide needs to be done or what
doctors actually do."26 The main stricture here is that physicians require a
fee code when billing medicare for a specific service, and the menu of fee
codes is renegotiated annually between provincial medical associations
and provincial health insurers. This is not a rigorous process in which the
comparative evidence is adduced for given therapies, and hard choices
are made about which should be added or delisted. Instead, the list has
tended to expand year after year, as new treatments are added while old
treatments remain on the list.2 7
The point is not that the current CHA forbids this type of accountability;
it simply does not do enough to achieve it on an ongoing basis. Over the
years, there have been isolated attempts at systematically examining the
basket of "medically necessary care" and delisting unnecessary services.
In the early 1990s, for example, Ontario considered deinsuring a range of
services, including costly cosmetic and reproductive procedures, as well
as routine annual physicals. Physicians groups were actually in favour of
23. Gillian Booth et al, "Universal Drug Coverage and Socioeconomic Disparities in Major Diabetes
Outcomes" (2012) 35:11 Diabetes Care 2257.
24. Mark Stabile, "Private Insurance Subsidies And Public Care Markets: Evidence From Canada"
(2001) 34:4 Can J Economics 921; Sarah Allin & Jeremiah Hurley, "Inequality in Publically Funded
Physician Care: What is the Role of Private Prescription Drug Insurance" (2009) 18:10 Health
Economics 1218.
25. Elias Mossialos, Tom Walley & Caroline Rudisill, "Provider incentives and prescribing behavior
in Europe" (2005) 5:1 Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res 81.
26. Nuala P Kenny, What Good is Health Care? Reflections on the Canadian Experience (Ottawa:
Canadian Hospital Association Press, 2002) at 62.
27. Flood, Tuohy & Stabile, supra note 10 at 62.
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delisting some specialist services, because once deemed not medically
necessary, they are allowed freer rein to provide them in the more lucrative
private market.28
Because the CHA operates at the interface of the federal government
and the provinces, it does not provide any accountability mechanism that
can be exercised by patients vis-a-vis decisions about what falls within
the medicare basket.29 There have of course been a variety of Charter
challenges, alleging that health care funding decisions by government
violate the section 15 equality guarantee and/or the section 7 guarantee of
security of the person.3 0 Overall, the courts have been highly deferential
to the legislature on this front,31 explaining in Auton v. British Columbia
that "the legislature is under no obligation to create a particular benefit,"3 2
and that "[t]he legislative scheme... namely the CHA... does not have as
its purpose the meeting of all medical needs."33 As Choudhry explains,
"[t]he clear message from the Court was that the Court did not wish judges
to be drawn into adjudicating upon the design of medicare on a case-by-
case basis, a task for which they are poorly qualified."3 4 Elsewhere, we
have asked whether the courts have options for assisting plaintiffs here,
short of adjudicating particular therapies on a case-by-case basis.3 5 One
option, which joins up with our recommendations below, is that the courts
might prod government to at least establish a transparent and reasonable
process for making these determinations.
All of this yields results that are perverse from the standpoint of
achieving optimal results from a financially strained public health
system. While patients with diabetes die for lack of drug coverage,
provincial insurers will, as a matter of course, pay for therapies that are
comparatively unimportant (e.g. bunion removal), so long as they are
delivered by a physician. And indeed, the predominant payment model-
28. Tuohy, supra note 15 at 219.
29. But see Sujit Choudhry, "The Enforcement of the Canada Health Act" (1996) 41:2 McGill LJ
461.
30. Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624, [1997] SCJ No 86; Auton
(Guardian as litem of) v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 78, [2004] SCJ No 71
[Auton].
31. Colleen M Flood & YY Brandon Chen, "Charter of Rights & Health Care Funding: A Typology
of Canadian Health Rights Litigation" (2010) 19:3 Annals Health L 479.
32. Auton, supra note 30 at para 41.
33. Ibidatpara43.
34. Sujit Choudhry, "Worse than Lochner?" in Colleen M Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin,
eds, Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) 75 at 93.
35. Bryan Thomas & Colleen M Flood, "Putting Health to Rights: A Canadian View on Global
Trends in Litigation Health Care Rights" (2015) 1:1 Can J Comparative & Contemporary L 49.
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fee-for-service-encourages over-delivery of physician services. One oft-
cited study estimates that between 30 to 40 percent of total health care
utilization in Canada is unnecessary, attributable to "physician-induced
demand."36
III. How should we make decisions on what to fund?
The challenge, then, is to at once open up the basket of public coverage
to encompass the true range of "medically necessary" health goods and
services, while at the same time targeting coverage at those goods and
services that are most beneficial and cost effective. This will inherently
require flexibility in our legal and governance design, as the contents of
the medicare basket must evolve with technological advancements and
Canadians' changing medical needs.
This may sound like a recipe for ever-increasing expenditures and
mean that public health care is unsustainable over the long term. Thus,
an equally important component, to be combined with flexibility, is the
ability to deinsure treatments that are relatively unimportant. We are
not Pollyannaish about how difficult this will be to implement: merely
because a given therapy is relatively unimportant, this does not mean it
is unimportant altogether. Decisions to delist-or to fund only in special
circumstances-will be resisted by some groups because they value
either the service itself or the income earned from delivering the service.
However, there are examples where this principle has been implemented
effectively, such as Pharmac in New Zealand, which is tasked with
providing universal drug insurance for all citizens within the strictures of
a limited budget and must therefore make hard choices, at times in the face
of formidable public protest and political interference.3 7
What is clear from the literature and experience of different systems
in defining what should be the range of insured benefits is that there is
no right answer for all systems.3 8 What is fair and just for any particular
health-care system will be a function of its resources, the needs of its
36. Gregory L Stoddart et al, Why Not User Charges? The Real Issues (Toronto: Premier's Council
on Health, Well-being and Social Justice, 1993).
37. Jacqueline Cumming, Nicholas Mays & Jacob Daube, "How New Zealand has contained
expenditure on drugs" (2010) 340:7758 Brit Med J 1224.
38. Lawrence Jacobs, Theodore Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, "The Oregon Health Plan and
the Political Paradox of Rationing" (1999) 24:1 J Health Pol Poly' & L 161; Jacqueline Cumming,
"Core Services and priority-setting: the New Zealand experience" (1994) 29:1 Health Policy
41; Government Committee on Choices in Health Care, 1992, Choices in Health Care (Chair: AJ
Dunning) (Netherlands); Segev Shani et al, "Setting priorities for the adoption of health technologies
on a national level-the Israeli experience" (2000) 54:3 Health Policy 169; Michael Drummond &
Corinna Sorenson, "Nasty or Nice? A Perspective on the Use of Health Technology Assessment in the
United Kingdom" (2009) 12 Value in Health S8.
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people, and changing medical innovation and technologies. Further, what
is fair and just for a health-care system at one point in time will not be so in
the future because the various factors-needs, resources, and technologies
to meet those needs-are constantly changing. Consequently, the best we
can do from a public policy perspective is make sure we have robust and
fair processes to determine what is publicly-insured at any particular time.
In our view, this basic principle of fairness is what should be enshrined in
the CHA. With appropriate enforcement this will ensure a better future for
Canadian medicare and the people that it serves.
There is an interesting congruence between health policy experts, legal
scholars, and moral philosophers around this emphasis on accountability.
Philosophers Daniels and Sabin have made the case that citizens in pluralistic
societies will never reach moral agreement on principles for resolving
rationing problems; thus, they claim, our aspirations for justice in health
care should aim at achieving fair processes for rationing. What does a fair
process look like, from the standpoint of a philosopher? Daniels and Sabin
set out four basic conditions for a fair process. First, the Publicity Condition
requires that rationales be publicly accessible, in part because this enables
a sort of "case law" effect whereby decisions are made on a principled and
consistent basis. Second, the Reasonableness Condition requires that the
reasons for coverage rest on a reasonable construal of how society should
achieve value for money in health care. Third, their Relevance Condition
requires that decisions account for pertinent facts, and assign no weight to
irrelevant facts-e.g., the fact that a given treatment benefits a vocal and
politically mobilized segment of the population is irrelevant in deciding
whether to provide coverage. Fourth, the Appeals Condition requires that
patients have an opportunity to challenge rationing decisions, ensuring an
ongoing and iterative form of accountability where past decisions can be
challenged in the light of advancing medical knowledge, unique clinical
circumstances, and so on.3 9 To lawyers, the conditions laid out by Daniels
and Sabin may seem elementary-we expect our courts to abide by these
conditions as a matter of natural justice. Within our health- care system,
though, it is not at all uncommon for patients to be confronted by what
appear to be arbitrary rationing decisions, with no apparent avenue for
clarification or appeal.
39. Norman Daniels & James E Sabin, "Limits to healthcare: Fair procedures, democratic
deliberation, and the legitimacy problem for insurers" (1997) 26:4 Philos Public Aff 303.
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IV. Reform of the CHA
What then is required to reform the CHA? We have made the case that the
CHA needs to be modernized: to be expanded to include a broader range of
services beyond those supplied by physicians and in hospitals. However,
much of the present case for changing the CHA is made not for expanding
its protective reach, but to privatize what it presently protects. Thus,
before we begin this section, it is important to mention how a campaign
to modernize the CHA could be co-opted to a regressive end and to think
through how to avoid this outcome.
There are multiple false arguments put forward for the privatization
of hospital and physician services that are currently publicly insured
under the CHA. Most rest on the multiple failings of the present Canadian
system-blaming the woes of inefficiency, long wait times, lack of breadth
of coverage, relatively high overall spending and so forth on the very fact
ofpublic financing. If only, the privatization merchants argue, there was a
greater role for more private finance (and in particular, so that individuals
with greater wealth could use a bit of extra money to jump queues) our
problems would be cured." To be sure, in recent years, it has been easy
to paint Canada as a relatively poor performer in international rankings,
adding fuel to the fire that change is required." But blaming the "public"
part of the Canadian system for problems of, for example, wait times
misdiagnoses the problem. All of this argumentation for more privatization
flies in the face of health services research evidence showing that public
finance is not the cause of problems of inefficiency and over-spending;4 2
indeed, it is more often the solution to these kinds of issues. Unregulated
private finance, for example, as we see in the US, raises both prices and
overall expenditure without any commensurate increase in performance
or improved health outcomes. Systems with much higher overall rates of
public finance, such as England, tend to perform well both on equity and
efficiency grounds.
40. See e.g. Nadeem Esmail & Bacchus Barua, "The private sector plays a role in other universal
health systems. Why not here?," Editorial, The National Post (25 November 2015), online: <news.
nationalpost.com>; Jeffrey Simpson, "It wouldn't kill us to look at Australian health care," Editorial,
The Globe andMail (24 November 2010), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>; Brian Day, "30 years
of health-care dysfunction," Editorial, The National Post (1 April 2014), online: <news.nationalpost.
com>.
41. Davis et al, supra note 5 at 24.
42. Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Colleen M Flood & Mark Stabile, "How Does Private Finance Affect
Public Health Care Systems? Marshaling the Evidence from OECD Nations" (2004) 29 J Health
Pol Pol'y & L 359; Stephen J Duckett, "Private care and public waiting" (2005) 29 Aust Health Rev
87; Sara A Kreindler, "Policy strategies to reduce waits for elective care: a synthesis of international
evidence" (2010) 95 Brit Med J 7.
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The repeated arguments made for further private finance as
salvation for Canadian medicare are in part due to ideology against
redistribution and in part due to interest groups who seek further
avenues to game the system and secure higher rents. For example,
some Canadian physicians, not content to be among the highest
paid in the world,4 3 want, in addition to the public moneys they are
paid, to be able to charge patients additional private fees ("extra-
billing"). Somewhat extraordinarily, this advocacy has been able to
be transformed into a constitutional claim by employing the Charter
ofRights and Freedoms. The constitutional argument is, of course, not
framed in the desire of physicians to make more money, but as a claim
that the fundamental integrity of patients is challenged by limits in
public medicare, resulting in wait times that may cause suffering. The
appeal of private finance as a safety-valve, allowing those with means
to buy their way past public restrictions, has received some traction in
the courts, indeed at the highest level in the 2003 Supreme Court case
of Chaoulli." But, as mentioned earlier, the overwhelming research
evidence shows the regressive and inefficient effects of increased
private finance in a system. The public part of the Canadian system is
being blamed (with some success) both in the media and in the courts
for the problems of the system, rather than the blame being laid where it
rightly lies, namely with the large role for unregulated private finance.
But as progressives wage the battle to maintain one-tier medicare-
fighting off court challenges and increased media attacks-they risk
not fighting a larger and more important war. A focus on protecting the
present one-tier system of finance for hospital and physician services
means that the drive to expand public medicare to other areas-that
today are as much ifnotmore important-constantly falter. For example,
arguments in favour of including prescription drugs in the CHA falter
on the same old shoals of yesteryear, namely that by some mysterious
set of forces overall costs for drugs have to be reduced before they are
included in universal medicare. The newest Minister of Health, Jane
Philpott, has suggested that "before we take on responsibility for even
considering an expansion of what will be publicly funded we need
43. Mark Stabile, "Paying doctors and wait times: How does Canada compare?," Editorial, The
Toronto Star (2 May 2012), online: <www.thestar.com>.
44. See litigation launched by Dr. Brian Day challenging BC laws preventing extra-billing: Writ
of Summons filed by Dr. Brian Day and three other private surgical companies (2009), online:
<www.bchealthcoalition.ca/what-you-can-do/save-medicare/court-documents>.
Modernizing the Canada Health Act
to drive down drug costs."" Again, the international research evidence
is very clear-publicly financed systems are not only more equitable but
generally more efficient, as they are able to achieve lower prices. Thus,
in order to get prices down and reduce costs, governments must press out
boldly and expand coverage to include a broad range of services. As a
consequence, they will have better price control over a broader range of
services that are of higher value to Canadians. This will also result in a
fairer and more effective system, enabling priorities for funding health
services to go to the highest value. They will be able to secure more for
less, and maximize public welfare.
In terms of reform of the CHA we would make the following
recommendations:
a. The CHA be expanded to include a broad range of kinds of health care,
including prescription drugs, diagnostics, mental health (psychology),
home care and dental care. The CHA should be amended to require
that the Minister appoint an expert taskforce every five years to
report on the general areas of care/service delivery and whether broad
categories of care/services should continue to be included or excluded.
b. The CHA be amended to illuminate the present definition of "medical
necessity," which is presently undefined. Reform must be respectful
of differing provincial needs and resources but will require provinces
to meet basic principles of fairness by implementing an arm's length,
evidence-based process to determine on a rolling basis what services
and goods are publicly insured. To be clear, this does not have to be a
hard-and-fast list. It likely will be that the evidence supports funding
of certain services for certain treatment profiles and not for others:
thus conditional listing is likely to be the norm. The CHA should be
amended to require each province put in place aprocess, which follows
Norman Daniels's accountability for reasonableness framework and
general principles of procedural fairness from administrative law.46
The CHA should require (1) there be an arm's length body tasked with
prioritizing services, (2) there should be opportunities for individuals
to make the case for funding particular treatments, (3) reasons should
be provided (and thus the basis for choices to fund or not fund will be
transparent), (4) and there should be the possibility of appeal.
45. Allison Vuchnich, "Medical journal urges health minister to use science and evidence to guide
public policy," Global News (7 December 2015), online: <www.globalnews.ca>.
46. Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2008).
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c. The CHA should be changed to acknowledge that not all services of
any value will be funded, but that citizens should expect that a broad
range of important services will be publicly-funded and that these
determinations will be made on the basis of a fair and open process.
d. The CHA should bind the federal government o put in place a process
to monitor what services are publicly funded across different provinces
and to make this information available to Canadians on a central
website, so that differences between provinces can be monitored over
time.
One issue that remains to be resolved is the role for extra-billing
and user charges. As explained, bans on extra-billing and user charges
for hospital and physician services were brought into place as part of the
CHA in 1984 in response to growing accessibility through the 1970s as
physicians charged patients add-on fees for publicly-insured services.
There is no evidence that this problem would not re-emerge if the bans
were lifted in the present day. Some countries-notably England-allow
a small two-tier system on top of the public system. But one can't assume
that because something works in one country it will necessarily work
the same way in another. Extra-billing is largely a non-issue in England
because, as explained, their specialists and surgeons are employed and
paid on a salary basis on contract in public hospitals, ensuring that the
vast proportion of physician work manpower serves the public system
and with no ability to "extra-bill." In sharp contrast to England and many
other countries, Canadian physicians continue to be paid predominantly
on a fee-for-service basis. Allowing extra-billing would sanction the vast
majority of Canadian physicians to charge whatever they wished to the
vast majority of Canadian patients. Given this present state of affairs, it is
rational for the Canada Health Act to maintain the bans on extra-billing
and user charges for "medically necessary" physician services.
Aside from physician services, there may be arguments for some small
levels of user charges levied on some services in some circumstances.
For example, wealthier individuals could be required to pay a larger
proportion of the cost of a service through a user charge. However,
having full coverage for the entire population ensures a level of political
commitment to the concept of public health insurance and for this reason
alone it likely is a good idea to cover all members of a community on a
first dollar basis. We would recommend that a modernized CHA require
universal, first-dollar coverage for all "medically necessary" goods and
services; however, provinces should be permitted to levy user charges
for services on wealthier members of society provided they evaluate the
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impact of user charges on access and equity and that this evaluation is
made publicly available every year. In the absence of such an evaluation/
report the levying of user charges should be considered in breach of the
CHA.
Conclusion
We need a system that is constantly evaluating what services merit public
funding (1) relative to the changing needs of Canadians, (2) according to
changing technologies, and (3) according to changing spaces and places
of care (e.g. out of hospitals and into community settings). A modem
health care system is not one that prioritizes hospital services or physician
services simply because they are delivered in hospitals or by physicians.
Instead, a modem system will rationally evaluate the evidence and impact
of a broad range of services that can advance human health and decide
which of these services should be insured for the community at that time.
Our prescriptions for eform will improve overall governance and result in
a Canadian health-care system that is better able to stand the test of time
by continually evolving to ensure a fair and efficient health-care system.
There are many political forces pushing the Canadian system to further
and greater levels of private finance. Consequently, our look here to the
future of the Canada Health Act may not be what actually happens in the
coming decades, but it is what needs to happen to ensure a just and fair
system for Canadians.
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